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Abstract 
This paper presents modeling approaches for wildlife and species conservation with a special 
emphasis on large mammals in a developing country setting. In such countries there are 
frequently conflicts over land use and species conservation, and institutions for managing 
conflicts are often weak or even lacking. In addition, most of the world species and 
biodiversity are found in developing countries. Two main issues are discussed. First, we study 
a situation where the wildlife is valuable, but is considered a pest by the local people living 
close to the wildlife. Second, we consider models with a discrepancy between management 
geography and biological geography, and where the species flows between a conservation area 
with no harvesting and a neighboring area with harvesting and possible habitat degradation. 
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1. Introduction 
Establishment of protected areas, like national parks, has traditionally been recognized as the 
single most important method for securing conservation of terrestrial animal species. In many 
developing countries, this practice dates back to the colonial area, and the objective has always 
been to protect wild animals and natural habitats through strongly restricted wildlife 
utilization1. However, particularly in developing countries, it is well known that this 
conservation policy has had some adverse effects. Land for establishing the parks has often 
directly displaced rural communities and curtailed their access to natural resources that 
traditionally were theirs. Land for cultivation and pasture has been lost, and antipoaching laws 
have criminalized subsistence hunting. Moreover, local people are often prevented from 
eliminating ‘problem’ animals to protect their crops and livestock. If they are bearing the real 
cost of conservation without obtaining any significant benefits from it, it is easy to understand 
why a negative attitude against wildlife conservation has emerged among the local people, in 
sub-Saharan Africa as well as in other places (see among others, Kiss 1990, Swanson 1994, 
Johannesen and Skonhoft 2005). 
 
Some aspects of this conflict between wildlife utilization and conservation will be discussed 
in this paper. The paper’s focus is on wildlife in the sense of large mammals, and the 
discussion is primarily related to a sub-Saharan Africa context where the institutions to tackle 
such conflicts are often weak, or even lacking. Particularly because of rapid human 
population growth, the basic underlying conflict between wildlife conservation and rural 
development in these countries, as well as in many other developing countries, is over land 
use. Land-use conflicts frequently translate into land conversion (see, e.g., Swanson 1994 and 
Schulz and Skonhoft 1996), but in this paper, land use for conservation is assumed 
unchanged. In the models to be considered, the setting is therefore that in which a well-
defined agency is managing a national park or game reserve of fixed size. On the other hand, 
this is also a setting in which the rural people, agropastoralists and smallholder farmers, are 
entitled to use the land near the park, and where the wildlife exploitation typically takes place 
in a myopic, or open-access, manner. 
 
                                                 
1 The history of establishing conservation zones is old, and today more than 5% of the earth’s surface is covered 
with such areas. These areas, however, serve also other purposes than protection of wildlife and plants, and the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) lists seven other kinds of protected areas in addition 
to parks (see, e.g., IUCN web page). 
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Within this broad framework, I discuss two main issues. I first look at the conflicting interests 
among the park agency and the local people, where wildlife is considered as valuable as well as 
a pest and nuisance. The park agency benefits from wildlife through tourism and possible safari 
hunting, while the local people also hunt wildlife, partly motivated by the need for reducing 
crop and other agricultural damage. Next, a situation with a discrepancy between management 
geography and biological geography is considered. The setting is here a protected area with no 
harvesting, and a surrounding area with harvesting and habitat changes where the species flows 
between the areas. Both density-dependent and density-independent dispersal are studied. The 
modeling approach is consistent throughout with bioeconomic models treating the species as 
biomass, or ‘normalized’ number of animals. I am therefore not considering models with 
different stages, or classes, of wild species. The models are formulated in a standard manner 
with a concave natural growth function and ‘well-behaved’ utility and profit functions meaning 
that the important issue of nonconvexity is not touched. Valuation issues are not discussed. 
Uncertainties of various types (environmental and ecological uncertainty, price fluctuations, 
etc.) are also swept under the carpet irrespective of their well-known presence. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the conflict models are presented, and I first 
look at a static model before touching upon some dynamic considerations. Section 3 contains 
the migratory models. I start with a situation where the dispersal is assumed to be of the 
density-dependent type, and then briefly present some results when the dispersal is governed in 
a density-independent manner. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Conflicting views on conservation and species values 
In sub-Saharan Africa, where wildlife conservation and establishment of protected areas have 
taken place at the expense of rural communities, a wild species is often a nuisance, interfering 
with livestock and crop production (Kiss 1990). The agricultural damage may take place in a 
variety of ways; including eating crops and pastures, preying on livestock, rooting, tramping, 
or pushing away obstructions such as fences. It is therefore a conflict related to wildlife 
conservation. This conflict is formulated in a two-agent model with a group of local people and 
a conservation agency. Within this framework, I first look at a situation where harvest is equal 
to natural growth and its ecological equilibrium. The economic equilibrium is assumed to be of 
the Nash type. 
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2.1 An equilibrium conflict model 
As in Johannesen and Skonhoft (2005), I consider the conflicting interest between an agency 
managing a protected area and the local people living in the vicinity of this area. The park 
agency benefits from wildlife through safari hunting and non-consumptive tourism services, 
such as wildlife viewing. The local people also hunt wildlife, but as the wildlife knows no 
boundaries and moves freely in and out of the protected area, the game also destroys 
agricultural crops and competes with livestock when outside the protected area. The wildlife 
therefore also represents a nuisance for the local people. Hunting by the local people is 
assumed to be illegal. However, because of small fund for policing and large protected area, 
poaching cannot be prevented by the park manager. Hence, de jure and de facto property rights 
differ. 
 
The two production activities practised by the conservation agency, non-consumptive tourism 
and hunting, and illegal hunting by the local people are constrained by wildlife abundance. One 
stock of wildlife X  (measured in biomass, or number of ‘normalised’ animals) represents the 
whole game population. The population dynamics is determined by natural growth ( )F X , 
assumed to be density dependent and of standard logistic type (see below), and the hunting of 
the park manager 1y , depending on effort use and number of animals 1 1 1( , )y y e X= , and the 
hunting of the local people 2y , depending on the same factors, 
1 1 2 2/ ( ) ( , ) ( , )dX dt F X y e X y e X= − − . Therefore, in biological equilibrium where total harvest 
equals natural growth, we have 1 1 2 2( ) ( , ) ( , )F X y e X y e X= + , or : 
(1) ),( 21 eeXX = .  
Increased hunting effort reduces the stock, / 0iX e∂ ∂ < , 1, 2i = , and for a given stock level 
equation (1) is hence downward- sloping in the 1 2( , )e e space. The biological equilibrium 
condition (1)  may therefore be considered as an iso-conservation line. Lines closer to the 
origin imply more animals as it represents less harvesting effort. 
 
The park manager obtains income from hunting wildlife, by selling hunting licences, and from 
non-consumptive tourism. The net benefit of hunting may be expressed as 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) ( , )B e X p y e X c e= −  where 1p  is the price of the safari hunting licence and 1c  is the unit 
cost of organizing the hunting, both assumed to be fixed. ( )W X , with 0>)X('W and 
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(0) 0W = , represents the benefit from non-consumptive tourism. Therefore, the current profit 
of the park manager is: 
(2)   1 1( , ) ( )B e X W Xπ = + . 
The local people derive utility from hunting wildlife illegally. The poaching benefit may also 
be written as 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , ) ( , )B e X p y e X c e= − , and where the price 2p  and unit cost 2c  generally 
differ from those of the park manager. Wildlife is also a nuisance, and the damage cost 
( )D X depends on the size of the stock. More wildlife means more damage, 0>)X('D with 
(0) 0D = . Accordingly, the net benefit to the local people is given by: 
(3)   2 2( , ) ( )U B e X D X= − . 
In the absence of a unified resource policy, there are several externalities. Just as in standard 
harvesting models, reciprocal harvesting externalities work through the hunting benefit 
functions. In addition, there are reciprocal stock externalities related to the stock values: more 
hunting effort by the park manager, ceteris paribus, induces a positive externality on the local 
people through a reduction in ( )D X . On the other hand, more hunting effort by the local 
people induces a negative external effect on the park manager through a reduction in ( )W X . 
 
The economic problem of the park agency is to determine the profit-maximizing hunting effort 
under the ecological constraint (1), given the effort of the local people. The necessary 
condition for a maximum (when having an interior solution) is: 
(4)  1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) / [ ( , ) / ]( / ) '( )( / ) 0B e X e B e X X X e W X X e∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ = . 
This represents also the park manager’s best-response function, denoted by 1 1 2( )e R e=  in 
Figure 1. Along the best-response curve, profit depends on the effort of the local people, 
)e( 2ππ = . In Figure 1, 0π  and 1π  yield two iso-profit curves, where 1π  > 0π . 
Figure 1 about here 
The economic problem of the local people is to determine the utility-maximizing harvesting 
effort 2e , subject to the ecological constraint (1) and the effort of the park manager. The 
necessary condition for maximum is: 
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(5)  2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , ) / [ ( , ) / ]( / ) '( )( / ) 0B e X e B e X X X e D X X e∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = , 
and is the local people’s best-response function, denoted by 2 2 1( )e R e=  in Figure 1. Along the 
best-response curve, utility depends on the effort of the park manager, )e(UU 1= , and implicit 
differentiation (the envelope theorem) implies 1 1 2 1( ) / ( / ')( / )dU e de B X D X e= ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ . 
Accordingly, greater effort by the park manager reduces the optimal utility of the local people 
if the marginal harvesting benefit dominates the marginal damage effect; i.e., if 
2( / ') 0B X D∂ ∂ − > . Hence, under this condition, the iso-utility curves, 0U  and 1U , in Figure 1 
are such that 0 1U U> . Otherwise, in the ‘nuisance’ case, when 2( / ') 0B X D∂ ∂ − < , greater 
effort by the park manager is beneficial because reduced damage dominates the reduced 
harvesting benefit. This is illustrated by the two iso-utility curves 3 2U U> . These iso-utility 
curves bend in the opposite direction to that of U0 and U1. The Nash equilibrium is given by 
the effort levels *1 0e >  and *2 0e >  in Figure 1. In addition, the iso-conservation schedule 
through the Nash equilibrium * * *1 2( , )X X e e=  yields the stock size. 
 
Within this simple model the degree of species conservation is determined by several forces 
that work in a relatively complex way. It is also generally not clear how the utility, or welfare, 
of the local people is influenced.  Welfare and conservation may go hand in hand, or in the 
opposite direction, as the comparative static results in Table 1 shows. The stock value 
functions are here assumed to be linear; i.e., ( )W X wX=  and ( )D X Xγ= while the harvesting 
functions are specified as Schäfer functions ( , )i i i iy e X e Xθ= where iθ is a productivity 
(‘catchability’) coefficient under which ( , ) ,i i i i i i iB e X p e c eθ= −  ( 1,2i = ).  In addition, the 
natural growth function is specified logistic, ( ) (1 / )F X rX X H= −  with r as the intrinsic 
growth rate and H  as the species carrying capacity represented by the size of the conservation 
area expressed in number of animals (or biomass).  
Table 1 about here 
Consider first the effect of an increase in the price of safari hunting licences 1p . The relative 
profitability of consumptive and non-consumptive activities of the park manager is affected, 
and the price increase results in greater hunting effort, given the effort levels of the local 
people. This causes an outward shift in )e(R 21 , and hence, 
*
1 1/ 0e p∂ ∂ >  and *2 1/ 0e p∂ ∂ <  It 
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can be shown that the increased effort of the park manager dominates the indirect effect 
relating to the local people. We therefore find * 1/ 0X p∂ ∂ <  and the new economic equilibrium 
intersects with an iso-conservation schedule further from the origin. The profit of the park 
manager increases, * 1/ 0pπ∂ ∂ > , while the utility effect for the local people depends on the 
sign of 2( / ')B X D∂ ∂ − . If the marginal harvesting benefit dominates, then * 1/ 0U p∂ ∂ < . In the 
opposite ‘nuisance’ case, when 2( / ') 0B X D∂ ∂ − < , we find 01 >∂∂ p/U * , in which case, 
increased profit for the park manager is associated with improved welfare for the local people. 
 
Increased profitability in non-consumptive tourism through a positive shift in w  has the 
opposite effect of an increase in 1p  as 1 2( )R e shifts downwards. Increased wildlife-induced 
damage motivates the local people to expend more harvesting effort and 2 1( )R e  shifts upwards. 
Therefore, *1 / 0e γ∂ ∂ <  and *2 / 0e γ∂ ∂ > . We also find 0<∂∂ γ/X * . In addition, more 
nuisance reduces the welfare of the local people.  An increase in 2p  increases the net 
harvesting benefit and motivates the local people to expend greater hunting effort. On the other 
hand, the increase in 2p  also reduces the value of wildlife damage relative to the value of 
wildlife meat, which has the opposite effect. Hence, the standard result of the Clark model 
(Clark 1990), *2 2/ 0e p∂ ∂ > , only arises if the nuisance is low relative to the harvesting cost. If 
the nuisance is relatively high, the price increase leads to reduced harvesting effort by the local 
people and to more wildlife. As shown in Table 1 more productive wildlife conditions through 
higher intrinsic growth rate r  and biological carrying capacity H not necessarily mean more 
conservation. The welfare effects of the local people are also unclear.  
 
The above analysis demonstrates that wildlife conservation may work directly against the 
interests of the local people, but the overall picture is far from clear. One important message is 
that reduced nuisance works beneficial for conservation as well as welfare improving of the 
local people. Hence, measures taken to reduce nuisance may therefore pay well off. Recently, 
however, the main approach to wildlife management and conservation has been to include the 
local people to gain their cooperation and support, which has eventually resulted in so-called 
integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) (see, e.g., Wells and Brandon 
1992). These projects involve varying levels of local participation, ranging from pure benefit 
sharing, such as transfers from wildlife-related activities, to a more far-reaching design of 
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community based management.  In Johannesen and Skonhoft (2005) pure benefit-sharing 
strategies are analysed. The general findings here are that while more conservation may be 
obtained, the effect on the welfare of the local people is ambiguous  
 
The fact that transfers to the local people may reduce their welfare is obviously a strange result, 
but can be explained that such transfers take place within a general equilibrium type 
framework where the harvesting effort of both agents as well as degree of species conservation 
are influenced by shifting prices and income.  If, say, the local people obtain a fixed proportion 
of the total park income, the relative valuation of the two activities of the park manager 
(hunting and tourism) is not influenced. The best-response function of the park manager 
1 2( )R e stays therefore unchanged. On the other hand, 2 1( )R e shifts inwards because the transfer 
increases the marginal cost of hunting and reduces the hunting effort. The new Nash 
equilibrium is thus characterised by more harvesting effort by the park manager and reduced 
harvesting effort of the local people. The indirect transfer effect, working through increased 
harvesting effort of the park manager and less harvesting of the local people, may be negative. 
Therefore, if this indirect effect is strong enough, the net result can be negative. An uncertain, 
or even negative, welfare effect of the local people is just what is predicted as a possible 
outcome following the logic of the classic externality paper of Lipsey and Lancaster (1955).  
 
In the above model the local people has been treated as a homogeneous group and hence, any 
conflicting interests among them have been neglected. Utility maximisation is assumed as well. 
Whether utility maximization is an adequate representation of the behaviour of smallholder 
farmers living under complex and often harsh conditions can clearly be questioned. 
Alternatively, assuming poaching to be of the pure open-access type, we may find that the 
species abundance is determined by the zero-profit (or zero-rent) harvesting condition. This 
arises given the standard Schäfer harvesting assumption where 2 2 2 2 2 2( , ) ( ) 0B e X p X c eθ= − =  
(see also above). The degree of conservation is then determined only by the price and cost 
parameters together with the harvesting productivity of the local people, 2 2 2/X c p θ∞ = . This 
zero rent stock size yields at the same time the iso-conservation line through equation (1). 
Together with the profit maximisation condition of the conservation agency  (4), or 1 1 2( )e R e= , 
the harvesting effort of the two agents are found. The only factors affecting the welfare of the 
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local people under these assumptions are the prices. The effect of an increased 2p will hence 
lead to less wildlife and damage and higher welfare as there is zero-profit harvesting. 
 
The assumption that the park manager maximises profit from both park activities may also be 
questioned. In many protected areas there is no commercial hunting, and hunting activity is 
simply culling to maintain the ecological system (see, e.g., Starfield and Bleloch 1986). 
Therefore, the goal of the park manager is typically to maintain a large and ‘sustainable’ stock 
of wildlife while keeping the ecosystem in shape. Under such a management scheme, the best-
response function of the conservation agency coincides with the iso-conservation schedule 
representing the target stock size. Hence, this condition together with the best-response 
function of the local people determines the harvesting effort of the two agents. Suggested that 
an interior solution exists for the effort use, we then find that factors improving the harvesting 
profitability of the local people at the same time will increase welfare as the nuisance is 
unchanged. 
 
2.2 Lack of information and a dynamic framework 
The above analysis is based on an assumption of complete information. Therefore, in the 
present context, the conservation agency is assumed to know the utility function of the local 
people and to know that this function is to be maximized, and vice versa. The species natural 
growth function is also common knowledge. Obviously, there are good reasons to question the 
complete information assumption, and the above model may be reformulated into a situation 
where the information is more restricted. In what follows, I assume that the agents just know 
the species abundance, in addition to own cost and benefit functions. In a restricted information 
situation, it is generally more appropriate to formulate the model in a time-discrete manner 
(see, e.g., Weitzman 2002), and where the stock growth reads: 
 
(6) 1 1 1, 2 2,( ) ( , ) ( , )t t t t t t tX X F X y e X y e X+ = + − − . 
With incomplete information, we have to be very clear about the timing and sequencing of the 
information coming up. At time t  both agents know the size of the wildlife stock. They 
harvest, and the harvest is based on the known stock size. When the natural growth is governed 
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by the stock size before harvesting, the next period stock size evolves as in equation (6) 2. The 
stock is then assessed by both agents and is known for sure before next year’s harvest starts, 
and so forth. In essence, each agent can therefore not distinguish between population changes 
due to natural growth and harvesting by the other agent. The agents are assumed to have the 
same profit and utility functions as above, but now written as 1 1,( , ) ( )t t t tB e X W Xπ = +  and 
2 2,( , ) ( )t t t tU B e X D X= − . If they base their harvest just on current economic and ecological 
conditions, and hence are myopic (see, e.g., Smith 1975), profit and utility maximizing give the 
first-order conditions 1 1, 1,( , ) / 0t t tB e X e∂ ∂ = and 2 2, 2,( , ) / 0t tB e X e∂ ∂ = , respectively (when again 
assuming interior solutions). These conditions yield the effort of both agents as a function of 
the stock size, and when inserted into equation (6) the species growth can be found. 
The above solution concept is, however, somewhat unrealistic, as the agents’ valuation of the 
stock does not influence their harvesting decisions. The fact that the species is a pest for the 
local people while representing a positive stock value for the conservation agency is therefore 
not taken into account. A simple, yet realistic, way to capture this problem is to assume that 
own harvesting effect on stock evolvement within the same period is anticipated. The benefit 
functions read then 1 1, 1,( , ) ( )t t t t tB e X W X yπ = + −  and 2 2, 2,( , ) ( )t t t t tU B e X D X y= − −  with 
first-order necessary conditions for maximum as: 
(7) 1 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,( , ) / '( )( / ) 0t t t t t t tB e X e W X y y e∂ ∂ − − ∂ ∂ =  
and 
(8) 2 2, 2, 2, 2, 2,( , ) / '( )( / ) 0t t t t t t tB e X e D X y y e∂ ∂ + − ∂ ∂ = . 
Condition (7) says that the conservation agency should harvest up to the point where the 
marginal harvesting profit equalizes the marginal stock value. This clearly implies positive 
marginal harvesting profit (as above). Condition (8) is parallel but implies negative harvesting 
profit on the margin. Again, these first-order conditions yield effort as a function of number of 
animals, 1, 1( )t te e X= and 2, 2 ( )t te e X= . Inserted into (6), I then find 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, natural growth may be governed by the stock size after harvesting, 1, 2,( )t t tF X y y− − . This 
formulation is appropriate if reproduction takes place after harvesting. It gives more complex maths, but does not 
change the qualitative structure of the model. 
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1 1 1 2 2( ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )t t t t t t tX X F X y e X X y e X X+ = + − − , which is a first-order nonlinear difference 
equation. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the dynamics when using the modified Schäfer harvesting function 
. ,
a b
i t i i t ty e Xθ=  with 0.5a b= = together with logistic natural growth. The stock growth may 
then simply be written as: 
(9) 1 1 2(1 / )t t t t t tX X rX X H k X k X+ = + − − −  
with 0ik >  ( 1,2i = )3. As seen in the figure, there are no oscillations and the equilibrium is 
approached monotonically. There are two reasons for this: first, the intrinsic growth rate r  for 
large mammals is small, and, second, harvesting stabilizes (see the classic May 1976 paper). 
The steady-state stock value can readily be found, and the profit and utility may be calculated 
as well. 
 Figure 2 about here 
 
Also, the degree of species conservation is now determined by several factors, and although the 
mechanism is different compared to the previous Nash model of strategic interaction, the 
ecological and economic driving forces are very much the same. Higher damage reduces the 
steady-state number of animals (see also Figure 2) while increased profitability in 
nonconsumptive tourism means more conservation. However, in contrast to the previous 
model, more profitable harvesting of the local people through a higher harvesting price 
unambiguously leads to fewer animals. The welfare effects on the local people of shifting 
economic and ecological conditions are also now generally ambiguous. If, say, the price of 
safari hunting licenses increases, we find the species abundance and hence the nuisance to be 
                                                 
3 With 0.5a b= = , the (myopic) first-order condition of the conservation agency and the local people yield 
2
1, 1 1 1 1( ) [0.5 ( ) / ]t t te e X p w c Xθ= = −  and 22, 2 2 2 2( ) [0.5 ( ) / ]t t te e X p c Xθ γ= = + , respectively. Inserted 
into the stock growth equation gives 
2 0.5 0.5 2 0.5 0.5
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( ) {[0.5 ( ) / ] } {[0.5 ( ) / ] }t t t t t t tX X F X p w c X X p c X Xθ θ θ θ γ+ = + − − − + . With 
1 1 1 1 1[0.5 ( ) / ]k p w cθ θ= −  and 2 2 2 2 2[0.5 ( ) / ]k p cθ θ γ= +  this reduces to the main text equation (9). 
Therefore, using this modified Schäfer function makes the harvest of both agents as fixed proportions of the stock 
size.  
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reduced in the long term. The harvest of the local people is reduced as well so the old 
equilibrium is located either to the left- or the right-hand side of the peak value of the natural 
growth function. However, irrespective of this, the harvest benefit is unclear as the actual 
outcome hinges on whether reduced offtake or reduced species density dominate the harvest 
benefit function. Therefore, the welfare effect on the local people is again generally ambiguous 
as well. 
 
3. Discrepancy management geography and biological geography 
The traditional way to counteract biodiversity threats and habitat destruction through 
establishing protected areas may also be challenged more directly by the fugitive nature of the 
animals. When wildlife moves freely in and out of a conservation area, it may be harvested 
legally, as well as illegally, outside the area. In addition, habitat land may deteriorate and 
disappear outside, and this may influence the species flow as well. Because of dispersal and 
lack of congruency between management geography and ecological geography, it will 
therefore be a conservation management problem in the sense that land use changes and 
harvesting taking place outside the conservation area influence, or spillover to, the species 
density inside this area. I first look at a situation with dispersal governed by a density-
dependent process. 
 
3.1 Spill-over of harvest and land-use changes into the conservation area 
Two areas: a reserve and a neighboring area, with two subpopulations of wildlife managed by 
two different agents are considered. The protected area is again managed by a conservation 
agency while the neighboring area is used by a group of local people (e.g., smallholder 
farmers). By assumption, the conservation zone is of fixed size and land use is also kept fixed. 
On the other hand, land use may change in the neighboring area, as habitat land can be 
converted into agricultural land. I abstract from any harvesting taking place in the 
conservation area, thus also excluding illegal activities such as poaching. 
 
As in Skonhoft and Armstrong (2005), I use a time-continuous model, and the population 
dynamics are given by (the time subscript is omitted): 
 
(10) 1 1 1 2/ ( ) ( , )dX dt F X M X X= −  
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and 
 
(11) 2 2 1 2/ ( ) ( , )dX dt G X M X X y= + − , 
 
where 1X  is the protected area subpopulation, 2X  is the neighboring area subpopulation while 
1( )F X and 2( )G X are the natural growth functions of the two subpopulations. In addition to 
natural growth and harvesting, taking place only outside the protected area, the two 
subpopulations are interconnected by dispersal given by 1 2( , )M X X . The dispersal, or 
migration, depends on the stock densities /i iX H ( 1,2i = ) in the two areas, for the moment 
ignoring any other migratory patterns (but see below). 
 
With no hunting (or harvesting), 0y = , and no land-use change taking place in the 
neighboring area; that is, for this area, carrying capacity 2H  is fixed and the isoclines of the 
system (10) and (11) will typically be as depicted in Figure 3 with the unique ecological 
equilibrium, *iX . To say something more about the equilibrium, the functional forms have to 
be specified. Natural growth is again assumed to be logistic (see above), while the dispersal 
function is specified as 1 2 1 1 2 2( , ) [ ( / ) ( / )]M X X m X H X Hβ= − with m as a parameter 
reflecting the general degree of dispersion—that is, topography, size of the areas, type of 
species, and so forth—and where a large m  value corresponds to species and a natural 
environment with large spatial movement. On the other hand, the parameter 0β >  reflects 
that the dispersion may be due to, say, different environmental conditions, predator-prey 
relations and competition within the two subpopulations. For equal /i iX H  ( 1,2)i = , 1β >  
results in an outflow from the conservation area and could be expected in a situation where 
there was greater predatory pressure inside the protected area, for instance due to there being 
no hunting in the reserve. On the other hand, when 0 1β< < , the circumstances outside the 
reserve are detrimental, creating less potential migration out of the reserve. Therefore, in 
contrast to the standard density-dependent dispersal models (see, e.g., Conrad 1999), possible 
intrastock or interspecies relations that may result in different concentrations in the two areas 
are incorporated; that is, the dispersal may be asymmetric (for more details, see Skonhoft and 
Armstrong 2005). 
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 Figure 3 about here 
 
In the standard case of symmetric dispersal with 1β = and no harvesting, it can easily be 
confirmed that both equilibrium stocks will be at their carrying capacities, *1 1 0X H= >  and 
*
2 2 0X H= > , and in equilibrium there are no flow of species between the two areas, * 0M = . 
On the other hand, with 1β > , as depicted in Figure 3, the result is *1 1X H<  and *2 2X H> . 
The natural growth in the conservation area is then positive while it is negative in the 
neighboring area. With 0 1β< < , *1 1X H> , *2 2X H< and * 0M < will hold. 
1 1 2 2[ ( / ) ( / )] 0M m X H X Hβ= − =  represents a straight line from the origin through the 
point 1 2( , )H Hβ in the figure. Hence, under this line we have 0M > making the reserve a 
source. When 1β >  as in Figure 3, it is therefore clearly an outflow of species from the 
conservation area and * 0M >  plus positive natural growth adds up to ecological equilibrium. 
At the same time, the equilibrium stock size in the surrounding area is too large to support 
positive natural growth, meaning that mortality dominates recruiting and is balanced by the 
inflow. 
 
The figure also indicates that the equilibrium is stable, and what happens outside equilibrium. 
Hence, starting with a small 1X  and large 2X , 1X  grows while 2X initially decreases, before 
it eventually starts growing as well. During the transitional phase where both subpopulations 
grow, the dispersal may change sign with inflow into the conservation area being replaced by 
outflow; that is, the conservation area changes from being a sink to being a source. The same 
shift in dispersal may happen when starting with a small 2X  as well as a small 1X . 
 
The crucial question is how harvesting and habitat degradation, both activities taking place in 
the neighboring area, may influence species conservation in the protected area. We start with 
habitat changes when there is no harvest, 0y = . When the local people use more land for 
agricultural production and 2H  decreases, both isoclines in Figure 3 change. In line with 
intuition, the equilibrium stock size *2X outside the reserve decreases. However, the effect on 
the stock inside the conservation area *1X  is ambiguous. The reason is that as both 2H and 
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*
2X decline, the change of the ratio 
*
2 2/X H  is unclear, and hence the effect on the dispersion 
between the areas becomes ambiguous as well. 
 
More detailed analysis (Skonhoft and Armstrong 2005) demonstrates that habitat degradation 
taking place outside the protected area generally represents no problem for species 
conservation in the protected area following the logic of this model of density-dependent 
dispersion. If the reserve is more advantageous for the species and 0 1β< < , it can be shown 
that the effect of habitat destruction outside means fewer animals and less conservation within 
the reserve, but all the time we have *1 1X H> . On the other hand, if the reserve is less 
advantageous for the species’ well-being with 1β > , habitat destruction outside means more 
conservation within the reserve. In the standard symmetric dispersal models found in the 
literature with 1β = , more land for agricultural use and habitat destruction outside the reserve 
has no effect whatsoever upon the stock in the reserve. 
 
When 0y >  and harvesting takes place with no changes in the land use and 2H  is fixed, the 
2X -isocline in Figure 3 shifts down compared to the nonharvesting case. The 1X -isocline is 
unaffected. As a result, the stocks in both areas decrease either species flow into or out of the 
conservation area. Not surprisingly, harvesting outside the protected area therefore translates 
unambiguously into a lower species density in the protected area. The degree of harvesting 
spillover is, however, closely related to the exploitation scheme of local people in the outer 
area. Different schemes may be analyzed, but open-access only is considered here. 
 
When again applying the standard Schäfer harvesting function 2y eXθ=  and the open-access 
zero-profit assumption (cf. also section 2), the number of species in the neighboring area 
becomes 2 /X c pθ∞ = . Inserted into equation (10) in equilibrium when 
1 1 1 1 1( ) (1 / )F X r X X H= − , the protected area subpopulation stock size reads 
21 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 2
4( ) ( )
2
H m m rmcX r r
r H H p H H
β β
θ
∞ ⎡ ⎤= − + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. Therefore, while the open access stock size 
outside the reserve is unaffected by the dispersal asymmetry (as well as the other biological 
parameters) due to the standard Schäfer harvesting function assumption, it is observed that a 
higher β  means a smaller open access stock in the reserve. Hence, 1β > , implying 
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detrimental conditions within the reserve, reduces the stock size compared with the standard 
models in which 1β = . The reason is that a higher β , for a fixed density in the outer area, 
means more dispersal. In a next step, this translates into a higher natural growth through the 
equilibrium condition 1 1 2( ) ( , )F X M X X= , and hence, a smaller stock abundance. Habitat 
degradation unambiguously means more animals as the species density in the outer area 
increases and the flow out of the reserve decreases. On the contrary, more intensive 
harvesting in the outer area due to a higher price, or a lower effort cost, works in the direction 
of less conservation. Therefore, in contrast to the Nash equilibrium model of section 2, the 
price effect is unambiguous. A high harvesting price may very well also drive the species 
density in the reserve below the maximum sustainable yield level, 1
msyX . This typically takes 
place if the natural environment at the same time is characterized by large spatial movement 
so that m is high. The intuitive reasoning saying that it is more difficult to conserve highly 
fugitive species holds irrespective of the outer area management practice. In reality, however, 
the dispersal may be influenced by fencing and other management measures taken by the 
conservation agency. An extension of the above model may be to introduce such control 
measures. 
 
3.2 Density-independent dispersal 
While the norm has been to focus on some form of density-dependent dispersal between a 
conservation area and neighboring areas, we often find that the dispersal is not of this type. The 
dispersal, or movement, may take place cyclically over the year, and the famous wildebeest 
migration in the Serengeti–Mara ecosystem is an example of such pattern (Sinclair and Arcese 
1995). Among others, reindeer migration and moose dispersal are typically seasonal as well 
(e.g., Skonhoft and Olaussen 2005). I proceed to look at a simple model with dispersal of this 
type, where the ecological conditions are such that a fixed fraction of the conservation area 
subpopulation temporarily migrates out while there is no migration of the other subpopulation. 
Again, a reserve without harvesting is considered, also neglecting possible poaching, while 
hunting takes place outside. 
 
This problem is studied by using a time-discrete model. When the harvesting (or hunting) 
fraction in the outer area at time t  is th andα  is the dispersal fraction, assumed constant over 
time, and migration (and harvesting) takes place after natural growth, the population dynamics 
of the conservation area subpopulation writes: 
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(12) 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1,( ) ( ( ))t t t t t tX X F X X F X hα+ = + − + . 
 
With no dispersal, the equilibrium population size will therefore simply be at its carrying 
capacity. For the subpopulation staying in the outer area all the time, the population dynamics 
is: 
 
(13) 2, 1 2, 2, 2, 2,( ) ( ( ))t t t t t tX X G X X G X h+ = + − + . 
 
Therefore, the assumption is that the outer area harvesters are not able to select between the 
two subpopulations. The conservation area subpopulation number of animals hunted is 
1, 1,( ( ))t t tX F X hα +  while 2, 2,( ( ))t t tX G X h+  is for the outer area. Total harvest in number of 
animals (or biomass) year t  is accordingly 1, 1, 2, 2,[ ( ( )) ( ( ))]t t t t t ty X F X X G X hα= + + + . In 
contrast to the previous model, it is no ecological interaction between the two subpopulations 
as there are no density-dependent processes (e.g., mortality) during the subpopulation 1 
migration period. 
 
This population model may be applied for studying dynamic as well as equilibrium harvesting. 
To begin with, I briefly summarize some dynamic features. Suppose first that harvesting takes 
place with a fixed harvesting fraction through time, th h= . Such harvesting may be due to 
some type of ‘routinized’ behavior among the local people, and because of weak institutions 
and the uncontrolled nature of the hunting, the harvesting fraction is likely to be high. When 
the harvesting is fixed in this manner, (12) and (13) will be two independent first-order 
nonlinear difference equations. Therefore, there will be no economic interaction among the two 
subpopulations, and the protected area subpopulation stock dynamics (as well as the outside 
subpopulation dynamics) will be very much the same as that found in the discrete time conflict 
model (section 2.2 above). The steady state will hence typically be approached without 
oscillations. When 1, 1 1,t tX X+ = , the conservation area subpopulation equation (12) 
yields 1 1( ) ( /(1 ))F X h h Xα α= − . Not surprisingly, a higher harvesting fraction and a higher 
dispersal fraction thus spill over to a smaller equilibrium number of animals when the natural 
growth function is of the standard logistic type—that is, just as in the above density-dependent 
dispersal model. 
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On the other hand, if the outside area harvesting takes place in a myopic profit-maximizing 
manner, it will generally be an economic interdependency between the two subpopulations. As 
already noted, the stock size when the harvest takes place, consisting of the outside area 
stationary subpopulation and the conservation area migratory subpopulation, is 
1, 1, 2, 2,( ( )) ( ( ))t t t t tX X F X X G Xα= + + + . When again using the modified Schäfer harvesting 
function a bt t ty e Xθ=   (with 0 1a< < and 0b > ), myopic profit maximizing makes harvesting 
an increasing function of the stock size, ( )t ty y X=  (see also section 2.2). Therefore, the 
harvesting fraction is linked to both subpopulations as well, ( ) /t t t th y X X=   4. Inserted into the 
population dynamics (12) and (13), the result is two interconnected first-order nonlinear 
difference equations. Under the assumption of logistic natural growth, I also now find the 
steady states to be approached monotonically for all realistic parameter values, and again 
harvesting works in a stabilizing manner. 
 
Equilibrium harvesting is then considered. When , 1 ,i t i t iX X X+ = = ( 1,2i = ) and th h= , with 
0 1h< ≤ , combination of equations (12) and (13) yields: 
 
(14) 1 1 1 2 2 2( ) / ( ( )) ( ) /( ( ))F X X F X G X X G Xα + = + . 
 
With logistic natural growth 1 1 1 1 1( ) (1 / )F X r X X H= −  and 2 2 2 2 2( ) (1 / )G X r X X H= − , and 
assuming the whole conservation area subpopulation subject to dispersal out of the 
conservation area so that 1α = , equation (14) can be written 
as 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1(1 / ) ( / )X H r r H r H r X= − + after some few rearrangements. When also assuming the 
same maximum specific growth rates for both subpopulations, 1 2r r r= = , it reduces to 
2 2 1 1( / )X H H X= . Therefore, for the given functional forms and parameter values, it is a fixed 
ratio between the equilibrium number of animals in the conservation area and the surrounding 
area for all harvesting levels 0 1h< ≤ . 
 
                                                 
4 An exception occurs when a bt t ty e Xθ=  with 0,5a b= = . In this case it can be shown that myopic profit 
maximizing yields a fixed harvesting fraction though time; that is, just as in the above harvesting scheme of 
‘routinized’ harvesting behavior (see also section 2.2). 
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It is now possible to establish a simple link between the outside harvesting and the reserve 
species abundance. In ecological equilibrium, natural growth equalizes number of animals 
removed of each subpopulation, and total harvest is 1 2( ) ( )y F X G X= + . Inserting for the 
natural growth functions and the fixed stock relationship 2 2 1 1( / )X H H X= yields: 
 
(15) 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1( ) (1 / ) ( / ) (1 / )y X rX X H r H H X X H= − + − . 
 
This relationship represents the equilibrium harvesting spillover from the exploitation area to 
the conservation area and is defined for all 1 0X > that ensures a positive 2X  through equation 
(14)5. In the present case of 1α = , this holds for all 2 0X > . Figure 4 illustrates the reserve 
subpopulation natural growth function, and harvest. The difference between these functions 
yields the outer area natural growth, and harvest. 
 
 Figure 4 about here 
 
Just as in the standard one-patch harvesting model, a given amount of animals removed may be 
sustained with a small as well a large degree of conservation while the maximum number of 
animals harvested coincides with the protected area maximum sustainable-yield stock, 
1 1 / 2
msyX H= . Different exploitation schemes may also be analyzed in the light of the 
sustainable yield function (15). First, it can be shown that the goal of maximizing outer area 
equilibrium harvesting profit gives a protected stock size above that of 1
msyX . This result 
follows intuitive reasoning, as there are stock dependent costs but no rate of discount involved. 
However, maximizing profit lacks realism due to weak institutions, and, again, open-access 
harvesting may fit reality better. The population size when harvest takes place, 
1 1 2 2( ( )) ( ( ))X X F X X G Xα= + + + , may now be written as 
1 2 1 1 1 1(1 / )( (1 / ))X H H X rX X H= + + − , when 1α = and inserting for 1( )F X and 2( )G X and 
using 2 2 1 1( / )X H H X= . Therefore, with the standard Schäfer harvesting function, zero profit 
harvesting ( ) 0p X c eπ θ= − = gives 211
1 2
4(1 ) (1 )
2 ( )
H rcX r r
r p H Hθ
∞ ⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
. 1X
∞  can be 
                                                 
5 Armstrong and Skonhoft (2006) introduce this function as the Induced Sustainable Yield Function (ISYF) in a 
density-dependent dispersal model. 
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located either to the right- or the left-hand side of the peak value of the yield function (15). A 
high price-cost ratio drives the solution to the left and below that of 1
msyX and was found in the 
density-dependent dispersal model as well. A small outer area habitat area works in the 
opposite direction. This result is also just as in the density-dependent dispersal model, albeit 
with different mechanisms now. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This article has presented modeling approaches for wildlife and species conservation with a 
special emphasis on large mammals, in a developing country context, and with special 
reference to sub-Saharan Africa. In these countries there are frequently conflicts over land use 
and species conservation, and the institutions to tackle such conflicts are often weak or lacking. 
Two main issues have been discussed; conservation conflicts, and cases with discrepancy 
between management geography and ecological geography because of the fugitive nature of 
the wildlife. The modeling approach has all throughout been bioeconomic models with wildlife 
as biomass, or ‘normalized’ number of animals, where the economy and the ecology interact 
through harvesting but also through land-use changes. Within this framework, it has been 
demonstrated that wildlife conservation can work directly against the interests of the local 
people, while wildlife damage reduction typically improves the degree of conservation as well 
as the living conditions of the local people. The dispersal models have shown how, and to what 
extent, harvesting and habitat deterioration from outside areas may spill over to a conservation 
area. 
 
The strength of stylized natural resource models, as presented here, is to clarify some 
fundamental principles of wildlife conservation problems. Within this framework, it is 
reasonable simple to understand the driving forces, and straightforward explanations can 
readily be given when contra intuitive results come up. The policy implications are often fairly 
simple to understand as well. In more complex, and hence more realistic models the driving 
forces are often progressively more difficult to understand and the policy implications are 
harder to grasp. However, in some instances, we need such models to better understand and 
explain the actual problem. Abandoning the standard biomass assumption may be such an 
extension, and the modeling insight can increase when species demography is introduced, see, 
e.g., Skonhoft et al. (2002) for an application where, among others, trophy hunting and 
migration are studied. To move behind the simplified assumption of a concave and well-
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behaved natural growth function may also bring additional understanding in certain cases. 
Some recent papers (see, e.g., Dasgupta and Mäler 2003) have demonstrated important new 
insights from this type of modeling. Including uncertainties of various types, related to the 
environment and ecology, but also to economic variables, is yet another extension. In cases 
with small and threatened wildlife populations, uncertainty is especially important to take into 
account (Lande et al. 2003). All these extensions of stylized natural resource models point in 
the direction that more integrated ecological-economic modeling approaches for conservation 
and biodiversity management in many cases may pay well off. Wätzold et al. (2006) discusses 
such integration. 
 
To better understand and explain the actual conservation and management problem, the 
economic part of the bioeconomic analysis needs also some reshaping. For example, the ideal, 
but unrealistic, world of complete information needs to be challenged more frequently. In the 
present exposition this problem has just been touched upon. However, in situations with more 
agents and where important information influencing harvesting and conservation is private, the 
presence of asymmetric information needs to be taken more fully into account for a fuller 
understanding of the real problem. From a regulation perspective, the distinction between 
private and common knowledge seems to be equally important (e.g., Weitzman 2002). 
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Table 1: The two agent conflict model. Comparative-static results  
 *e1  
*e2  
*X  *π  *U  
1p  + – – + ? 
w  – + + + ? 
γ  – + – – – 
2p  – +/– –/+ –/+ ? 
1c  – + + – ? 
2c  + – + + ? 
r  ? ? ? ? ? 
H  ? ? ? ? ? 
Note: +/– implies different sign effects *2e  and 
*X  (and *π ).  ? implies ambiguous sign effect. 
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Figure 1: The two agent conflict model. The Nash-equilibrium. 
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Figure 2: Species abundance in number of animals tX . Myopic, dynamic  
harvesting model. Baseline; 1 0.088k = and 2 0.172k = .No damage cost,  
2 0.040k = .Other parameter values; r=0.45, H=3,500 (number 
 of animals). Initial stock value 0 2,500X = (number of animals). 
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Figure 3: Density dependent dispersal model, 1β > .The isoclines in absence of  
harvesting.  
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Figure 4: Density independent dispersal model. Total harvest 1( )y X  ( solid line) 
and protected area  natural growth function 1( )F X (dotted line). 
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